The Chişinău Declaration: A Verbal Maze or an Attack on Human Rights?

In May 2026, European national governments agreed on the Chişinău Declaration. It calls on the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to restore to States the flexibility in managing migration they possessed thirty years ago.

Although the Declaration is not legally binding on the Strasbourg Court and can be interpreted in different ways, its political thrust is clear. Daniel Thym writes about this in his policy brief that appeared in the Analysen & Argumente journal of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

The Chişinău Declaration responds to a brief but intense debate initiated by the governments of Italy and Denmark with the active support of Poland, Austria, and Belgium, among others. Last year they unequivocally called for a stricter interpretation of human rights, particularly in deporting criminals and handling the instrumentalization of migration. The latter term refers to the facilitation of illegal entry into the EU, primarily by Russia and Belarus, with the aim of exerting political pressure on Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.

What began as an initiative of just a few governments quickly gained increasing support, particularly from the Council of Europe. This sends a strong signal to the ECHR and also to the national courts that protect human rights.

The Declaration calls for no fundamental turnaround, similar to the 1993 amendment to the German Constitution, that would overhaul Germany’s entire asylum policy. The content of the declaration is significantly less drastic than some may have hoped. It aims at a subtle rebalancing of jurisprudence, whose previous trends the states thereby indirectly acknowledge.

Legally, this is a political recommendation and not an additional protocol that the ECHR would be obliged to follow. Nevertheless, the Court will not simply ignore the declaration. Previous rulings have repeatedly invoked a legal and political ‘consensus’ to interpret human rights. However, there is no clear algorithm, and the final decision rests with the judges.

The ambiguous content of the Declaration and the lack of an obligation to follow it explain why it could take several years before a reliable assessment can be made of the extent to which the ECHR is prepared to change its jurisprudence. A forthcoming Grand Chamber ruling on Belarus’ instrumentalization of migration, which has been overdue for months, will attract considerable attention. States will interpret such a ruling as a signal that their concerns are being heard. The outcome on other issues is not expected to transpire so quickly.

Such a drastic reform requires courts to restore to policymakers the leeway they had three decades ago, but this is a risky affair. Governments may lack the necessary staying power for this – precisely because fundamental legislative reforms remain difficult as long as it is unclear whether the courts will accept them.

Even if the Chişinău Declaration were to bring about a change in jurisprudence, this will take time to materialize, and Europe has none. A Ceuta-like incident may repeat at any moment.

Original publication: https://www.kas.de/en/analysen-und-argumente/detail/-/content/the-chisinau-declaration