A Quiet Siege: China Methodically Undermines Dutch Tech Sovereignty

China’s interference in strategic industries of the Netherlands has long ceased to be a set of individual episodes. It is a long-term systemic effort that erodes the country’s technological edge and strategic autonomy.

In a report by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and the China Knowledge Network entitled Beyond Borders: Chinese Use of Foreign Interference Tactics in Dutch Strategic Industries, analysts Benedetta Girardi and Hans Horan show how Chinese actors use cyber espionage, talent recruitment and economic pressure and act on supply chains. They mainly target three key sectors: semiconductors, aerospace, and maritime industries.

The authors find the greatest risk in the semiconductor sector. The Netherlands occupies a uniquely critical position in global production of advanced chipmaking equipment, which makes the industry a priority target. Any stable access to this sector’s technologies, talent and industrial know-how translates into a strategic advantage that is then extremely difficult to offset. Even partial loss of this advantage directly weakens Europe’s standing in global technological competition. The maritime sector is considered a high-risk one due to its openness, global coherence, and significance for trade and NATO logistics. Here vulnerability results from technology as well as the possibility of influencing critical infrastructure and routes. The aerospace sector represents a moderate-to-high risk associated with the acquisition of dual-use technology and capabilities.

Across all the three sectors, the same logic rules. China exploits European openness, digitalization, and economic interdependence. Its efforts are coordinated and pursue an overarching strategic objective. And the Dutch governance system remains fragmented: different institutions see individual threats but are poor at merging them into a general pattern. This results in belated responses, with cumulative damage only becoming visible when the technology lag is already hard to eliminate. It is this cumulative nature that makes the threat especially dangerous: each individual episode can be explained or understated until they add up to start altering the balance of power.

The authors suggest creating a national coordination and intelligence-sharing architecture, implementing mandatory security standards in strategic sectors, forming a resilience fund, and adopting a model of ‘managed interdependence’ vis-à-vis China. These recommendations look sound on paper, but in practice they run into a problem faced by almost all Europe: reluctance to sacrifice long-term economic benefits for long-term security. So long as the Netherlands mainly sees Chinese presence through the lens of investment and exports, systemic pressure on it will only mount.

An additional complexity is that many levers of influence remain below the threshold of direct conflict and thus difficult to tackle with classical responses. Cyber espionage, talent recruitment programs and investments in related companies rarely look like obvious threats when ongoing. They pile up quietly. When their cumulative effect transpires, it is already far more expensive and politically painful to change things. European countries, including the Netherlands, still prefer to react to separate incidents rather than build systemic resilience to this very model of influence.

The Netherlands is still clinging to a comfortable model of benefitting from cooperation and hoping that the strategic risks will remain manageable. This model no longer works. The longer the country postpones tough decisions, the higher price it will have to pay for regaining control over critical technologies and infrastructure. At some stage, the vulnerabilities will cease to be theoretical and come to restrict political decision-making directly. Then all talk about strategic autonomy will refer to residual sovereignty, rather than choices.

Original publication: https://hcss.nl/report/beyond-borders-chinese-use-of-foreign-interference-tactics-in-dutch-strategic-industries/