European Union in Search of New Partners

Norway and Moldova, Canada and India, the United Kingdom and Ghana: these countries little in common. They differ in strategic culture, regional priorities, and in their relationships with the major powers. Yet, in little more than two years, the European Union has concluded a new kind of agreement with all of them – bilateral Security and Defense Partnerships (SDPs).

The issue was examined by Jake Benford, senior expert for Europe and geopolitics at Bertelsmann Stiftung, and Nicolai Von Ondarza, head of the EU/Europe Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. Their joint study appeared in the German Internationale Politik Quarterly publication.

Since 2022, the European Union has become much more active in the defense and security area. It was in this context that twelve Security and Defense Partnerships (SDPs) were concluded. The emergence of such a high number of partnerships in little more than two years raises three key questions. With what kind of States is the EU choosing to build such relationships? What kind of cooperation do they actually offer? And what will determine whether they become a meaningful instrument of European security policy?

So far, the EU’s partners can be broadly divided into three circles.

The first circle is composed of countries already closely aligned to the EU – via the European Economic Area (EEA) or as accession candidates. Among these, Norway and Iceland have a particularly close security relationship with the EU. They are especially interested in security cooperation in the High North.

A second circle comprises ‘like-minded’ NATO member States beyond the EU, namely Canada and the United Kingdom. In the latter’s case, the security partnership agreement helped revive elements of foreign and security policy cooperation that had been lost after the UK exited the European Union.

A third and broader circle is made up of the EU’s global partners. Among these, there is a clear focus on the Indo-Pacific, with SDPs concluded with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and India. Ghana is so far the only African country to have signed such an agreement. All these countries have the same reason to cooperate with Europe. They seek to reduce their security dependence on the USA without renouncing – or replacing – U.S. presence.

A most important element of the Partnerships is their link to the EU’s defense financing and defense industrial cooperation instruments. The SDPs become a political prerequisite for preferential access to the European armaments market – even for States outside the EEA. Yet granting a country’s own defense industry enhanced access to procurement is conditional on a further agreement based on an existing SDP.

The logic behind the agreements suggests some obvious conclusions. For decades, the EU’s international attractiveness rested primarily on access to its domestic market, its institutions and, for some countries, on the prospect of membership.

Now that it comes to security, the EU can only become an attractive partner by developing a strong defense industrial base. And this is highly problematic for now. United Europe has failed to properly equip Ukraine on its own, without U.S. weapons and assistance. However much some may support the Partnerships, these risks remaining on paper – particularly because of this.

Original publication: https://ip-quarterly.com/en/eu-search-new-partners