NATO 3.0: America Withdrawing, Europe Again Unprepared

In a policy brief of the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW) entitled NATO 3.0: from burden sharing to burden shifting and the Europeanisation of the Alliance, Polish analyst Piotr Szymański gives detailed examination to the NATO 3.0 concept being promoted by the U.S. administration. Washington’s proposal is straightforward: the USA cuts considerably its contribution to the conventional forces and assets assigned to Europe’s defense and shifts the main responsibility for conventional deterrence and defense to its European allies. Its nuclear umbrella remains technically in place, but conventional deterrence is to become mostly European.

The calm and professional analysis in the brief suggests rather a tough and uncomfortable conclusion: Europe is undergoing a real shock therapy to which it is largely unprepared. The author is explicit that the transition from ‘burden sharing’, pursued between 2014 and 2024, to ‘burden shifting’ carries a serious risk of creating critical capability gaps that will be very difficult to fill promptly.

There is a blatant gap between fine declarations and harsh reality. At the 2025 NATO summit in The Hague, allies agreed to more ambitious capability targets set within a four-year defense planning process. They also undertook to bring defense spending to 3.5 percent of their gross domestic product by 2035. According to a 2025 plan, Europe and Canada were to gradually assume 70 percent of the capability provision required, with the remaining 30 percent to be still provided by the USA. However, the current U.S. plans envisage much quicker and deeper reduction of U.S. contribution than expected. This applies to surface ships and submarines, tactical and bomber aircraft, aerial refueling aircraft and unmanned platforms. There is a parallel review of the permanent and rotational U.S. military presence in Europe.

The European countries will have to meet the capability targets already agreed while closing the gaps caused by the reduction of U.S. contribution in real time. This will require a rapid and large-scale increase in ground forces and the number of trained reservists, building up ammunition stockpiles, strengthening air and missile defense, and developing long-range missile systems, sixth-generation fighter aircraft, unmanned aerial systems of various types, transport and aerial refueling aircraft, as well as electronic warfare and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capabilities. Most European armies are unprepared for such a leap as regards their personnel strength, defense industry status, or stockpiles.

What should be feared is that the whole process is going on amid high uncertainty. The United States is sending contradictory signals. The timing and scale of the reductions have not been coordinated with European defense planning. For now, the NATO defense planning framework includes no clear and reliable mechanism for aligning U.S. retreat with European ramp-up. European countries risk finding themselves in a situation where U.S. forces and assets would already be withdrawn or reduced but European ones still unable to replace them. This creates a window of exposure that a potential adversary might use.

The author notes that the USA does not intend to leave NATO altogether and will remain in command of key components. Yet the number of U.S. officers in the command structures will probably be reduced. There has even been talk that the USA could relinquish the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Besides, Washington will probably place greater emphasis on allies that make the greatest spending and capability contributions (Poland, the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Germany).

In sum, the NATO 3.0 concept is quite illustrative of how fragile and unfinished the European defense building is. America does not withdraw from the alliance completely, but alters dramatically its responsibility balance. And Europe is left with less time, resources, and predictability than it needs for a safe transition. As long as the European capitals continue in the logic of gradual spending and capability increases rather than urgent and large-scale mobilization, the risks of serious deterrence gaps appearing remains high. And the so-called ‘Europeanization’ of NATO risks turning into a process ushering a greater responsibility on Europe – without its own defense capability being strengthened in proportion. As such, the alliance could become weaker just when it needs to be stronger.

Original publication: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2026-07-03/nato-30-burden-sharing-to-burden-shifting-and-europeanisation